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Abstract
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1. Introduction
In the BDI (belief-desire-intention) agent programming framework [? ], agents have the capability to achieve
goals by selecting and executing plans from a plan library. Plans comprise of goals and subgoals which ultimately
decompose into a sequence of primitive actions. There is a vast body of work in this area that addresses different
issues related to BDI systems. However, the relationship between goals and the information required to achieve these
goals has received limited attention. We call this the goal-to-information nexus, which we abbreviate as G2I.
Where does one begin to examine the relationship between goals and information? A starting point that holds
much promise lies with the plans (and actions) used for achieving goals. Plans and actions in BDI systems consist
of pre-conditions and post-conditions; the former are the executability conditions for plans and actions, whereas the
latter prescribe the results of the execution. The executability conditions are verified by the agent against its set of
beliefs, including the assumption made in typical BDI systems, that the verification proceeds smoothly. This begs
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the question of what happens if an agent cannot verify the executability conditions because there is no belief in its
belief set that is relevant for making such verifications? It is clear that this problem arises because the agent lacks
the necessary information it requires, and this is where we see the first connection between goals and information.
One way to handle this is by making the closed-world assumption, where anything that is not known is assumed to
be false. The main advantage of making the closed-world assumption is that less effort is required on the agent’s part
but making decisions based on this assumption could be dangerous, especially in critical situations. Alternatively, if
an agent is aware it lacks information, it may be endowed with the capability to launch specific actions to obtain the
necessary information in order to make informed decisions. This requires the agent to do more work but it may be
well worth it. We call these actions information-seeking actions.
Standard BDI systems, which are popular in the literature, are deterministic; an agent either believes in something
or it does not; the pre-condition of a plan, or action, is either true or false. However, if we allow for non-deterministic
(probabilistic) beliefs and pre-conditions, a second connection between goals and information arises. The concept of
the expected utility follows naturally from the probabilistic nature of beliefs, plans and actions. The expected utility of
executing a plan is wholly determined by the actions that are present in the body of the plan. Agents desire to get the
maximum expected utility possible, but if they are considerably uncertain about the pre- and post-conditions of plans
and actions, such desires are futile. Thus, agents must increase the certainty surrounding plans and actions. This too,
can be achieved with the help of information-seeking actions, which highlights another connection between goals and
information.
This paper is largely motivated by the second connection that we identified. We begin by formalising the notions
of probabilistic belief states, actions and plans. We then proceed to show, via a motivating example, how the expected
utility may be computed, and how agents may utilise information-seeking actions in order to determine the value
of information that such actions offer. We also briefly discuss the role that the goal-information nexus can play in
providing heightened situational awareness for operators in hostile environments with multiple agents.
2. Preliminaries
We use a propositional language L consisting of a finite set of atoms for our presentation but the ideas discussed
are also applicable to a first-order language. Literals are atoms, also called positive literals, or their negation (negative
literals). For instance, if a is an atom, a and ¬a are literals. We will reserve the letter l to denote literals. If l is a literal,
we use the upper-case letter L to range over the literals l and ¬l. The current state of the world, denoted by S , is a
complete assignment of truth values to all the atoms, i.e. for each atom, it consists of either the positive or negative
literal but not both. We use A to denote a BDI agent.
Belief State: An agent A ’s belief state, denoted as B, is a probability distribution over the set of all literals L .1
B(l) is the probability that the agent believes literal l is true. If B(l) = k, then B(¬l) = 1− k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Given
a set of literals, {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, we take B({l1, l2, . . . , ln}) to be the agent’s belief that all the literals in the set are true,
i.e. the conjunction of literals, and write it as B(l1, l2, . . . , ln). We will say that a belief state B is consistent iff for all
literals l ∈ L , B(l) +B(¬l) = 1.
Goals, Actions, Plans and Belief Update: In implementations of BDI systems such as in AgentSpeak - Jason[? ?
], agents have goals that are achieved by selecting applicable plans from a plan library. Various types of goals, such
as achievement and maintenance goals, have been identified in the literature. In our case, we focus on achievement
goals - a description of the desired state of the world that an agent would like the world to evolve to. Such goals
can be represented declaratively and this facilitates the means to reason about goals such as whether a goal has been
achieved, or whether two goals are in conflict [? ? ? ]. Formally, a goal G is a consistent set of literals.
The definitions for actions and plans that we use are similar to standard definitions that can be found in the literature
except that we annotate the literals in the precondition of an action and the context condition of a plan with probabili-
ties. Formally, an action a is a tuple consiting of a name, precondition pre(a) and postcondition post(a) where name
1 The assumption is that the agent’s belief state satisfies the axioms of probability. See the Dutch Book Arguments [? ].
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is the name of an action and, pre(a) is a set of 2-tuples of the form 〈l, P(l)〉 with 0 < P(l) ≤ 1, and post(a) is a
consistent sets of literals. P(l) is the minimum probability with which A believes l should be true for action a to be
considered executable. More on this will be provided in the section on executability that follows shortly. The reader
may object that P also constitutes an agent’s beliefs and should be included in B. This is a valid point, but for ease of
presentation we will represent them separately.
In BDI agent programming, an agent A may have several plans that can help achieve its goal G . To choose an
applicable plan, the agent uses the context condition C of a plan to test its applicability. If it passes the test, then the
body of the plan, consisting of a sequence of sub-goals (Gi) and actions (a j) may be executed. Note that there may be
more than one applicable plan and other ways of selecting a plan for execution may be needed. More formally, a plan
has the following structure: G : C : G1,G2, . . . , a1, a2, . . ., where G is the goal, the context condition C is also a set of
2-tuples of the form 〈l, P(l)〉 with 0 < P(l) ≤ 1, Gi are sub-goals and a j are actions. The sequence of sub-goals and
actions is referred to as the body of the plan.2
Executability of actions and plans: Typically, in AI planning, the agent has to be certain that each literal in the
goal’s context condition or action precondition is true for a plan or action to be deemed executable. In our case, we
must take into account the probabilistic nature of action preconditions and goal context conditions to determine when
an action or plan is executable. Given an agent A with current belief state B, A deems
• an action a executable iff ∀〈li,P(li)〉 ∈ pre(a), B(li) ≥ P(li), and
• a plan P executable iff ∀〈li,P(li)〉 ∈ C , B(li) ≥ P(li), where C is the context condition of P .
One may ask how the agent obtains the probabilities P(li). Such probabilities could be derived either from the agent’s
causal knowledge about actions or from the agent’s prior experience in executing these plans and actions.
Belief Update: Agents may update their beliefs either after receiving/sensing new information or after they perform
an action. Thus, they must be equipped with a mechanism that enables them to do so. In this paper, we assume that
an agent’s knowledge is encoded in a Bayesian Network [? ] and, depending on the level of certainty of the evidence,
we use two belief update mechanisms. Let B be A ’s prior belief state and l1 and l2 be two literals. B′ represents the
updated or new belief state.
Certain Evidence: If the agent is certain about the evidence (probability 1) that l2 is true, then B′(l2) = 1.
The updated belief in l1 is given by Simple Conditionalization [? ] as B′(l1) = B(l1 | l2).
Uncertain Evidence: If the evidence is uncertain, i.e. 0 < B′(l2) < 1, Simple Conditionalization can no
longer be used. Instead, we use Jeffrey Conditionalization [? ], and the updated belief in l1 is computed
as B′(l1) = B(l1 | l2)B′(l2) +B(l1 | ¬l2)B′(¬l2).
Note that in both cases the assumption is that the probabilities associated with the agent’s conditional beliefs remain
unchanged in updated belief states, i.e. B(l1 | l2) = B′(l1 | l2).
3. Expected Utility of Plans
Single Action Plans: We assume that an agent assigns utility values to goals. Intuitively, the utility value can be
taken to be the reward that the agent receives for achieving a goal - the greater the utility value, the greater the reward.
The utility of a goal G is denoted as U (G ). We will first focus on the case where a goal can be achieved by a plan P
with a single action a in the body of the plan. This will suffice to illustrate the core ideas in this paper and we will see
later that it easily extends to the multiple actions case.
2 Note that sub-goals and actions may appear in any order although what we have shown suggests there is a sequence of sub-goals followed by a
sequence of actions.
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P
Q
S
Tphone working
agent network up
customer network up
msg. sent
msg. rcvd.
B(q) = 0.99
B(p) = 1
B(t) = 0.9
B(s) = 0
B(r) = 0
Figure 1. The Bayesian Network for Ex. 1. The prior beliefs in B(s) and B(r) are 0 as the action to send the message has not been executed yet.
They are only updated after the action send sms is executed.
Example 1: Consider that a bank employs a BDI agent that can send SMS security codes to customers
for verifying transactions. Also, assume that the agent wants to message a particular customer in a rural
area. The mobile network is very reliable in the agent’s area and very rarely do its messages not get sent
for delivery. On the other hand, the mobile network in the customer’s area is slightly less reliable, and
sometimes the customer does not receive messages sent to her. The Bayesian network for this example is
shown in Fig. 1. The conditional probability tables (CPTs) relating parent and child nodes is simple for
this example and shown in Table 1. For the agent, knowing that either the phone is not working or that
its network is down means also knowing that its message will not get sent. Also, knowing either that its
message has not been sent or the rural network is down means it knows the customer will not receive the
message.
Table 1. Conditional probability table (CPT) for Ex. 1
P Q B(s)
p q 1
p ¬q 0
¬p q 0
¬p ¬q 0
S T B(r)
s t 1
s ¬t 0
¬s t 0
¬s ¬t 0
Let us formalise the example above. Let L consist of the literals: p: the BDI agent’s phone is working,3 q: the mobile
network is up in the agent’s area, r: the customer received the message, s: the message was sent to the customer, and
t: the mobile network is up in the customer’s area
Let the agent’s current belief state be B with: B(p) = 1, B(q) = 0.99, B(s) = 0 B(r) = 0 and B(t) = 0.9.
B(s) and B(r) are zero because the agent has not sent the message yet. They are in this sense special nodes and
that is why they are shown with dotted lines in Fig.1. We assume that the probabilities for p, q and t are based on
the agent’s knowledge and/or its prior experience. Let goal G be: G = {r, s}. Let the plan that has been selected
to achieve G be: {r, s} : {〈q, 0.90〉} : send sms where send sms is an action. The context condition for the plan,
{〈q, 0.90〉}, states that the agent must believe with at least probability 0.9 that its network is up to be able to execute
this plan.4 If this is not the case, alternative plans may be pursued. The action send sms has the following properties:
pre(send sms) = {〈p, 1〉} and post(send sms) = {r, s}. The precondition of send sms states that the agent must be
certain that its phone is working before sending a SMS message. The postcondition states that the result of executing
the action is that the SMS is sent and the customer receives the SMS. However, life is not ideal - the message may not
get sent and/or the customer may not receive it.
3 We say phone here but in reality it may be just be a software that communicates with a mobile network.
4 The reader may question why p is not included in the context condition. It could be but we decided to include p in the pre-condition of the
action send sms. In either case, the analysis would change slightly but the principle remains the same.
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Belief Update Single Action: Given an agent’s current set of beliefs, we are interested in computing the expected
utility that an agent may derive from executing a plan. However, we first look at how beliefs may be updated after
executing an action.
Example 1(cont.): In our example, as C = {〈q, 0.90〉}, we have P(q) = 0.90. Since B(q) = 0.99 and
B(q) > P(q), the plan is applicable. Likewise, for pre(send sms) = {〈p, 1〉}, B(p) ≥ P(p), therefore
send sms is executable. Assume the agent presses the send button and receives no error message. Note
that pressing the send button doesn’t necessarily mean the message has been sent. The agent now has to
update its beliefs. Technically, there is no new evidence about p, q and t, i.e. their probabilities remain
unchanged, but s and r must be conditioned by them, so we take it there is newly received evidence about
them. The probabilities associated with p, q and t in the updated belief state B′ are:
B′(p) = 1, B′(q) = 0.99 and B′(t) = 0.9.
The probabilities for s and r must be updated given new evidence about p, q and t. We must deal with s
first. It will become clear why so. Due to conditional independence assumptions in Bayesian Networks,
we know that s is independent of any other node given its parents p and q. However, since B′(q) < 1, we
use Jeffrey Conditionalization to get the agent’s updated belief in s as follows:
B′(s) =
∑
P,Q B(s | P,Q) B′(P,Q) = B(s | pq) B′(p, q) = 0.99 5
Similarly, we get B′(r) :
B′(r) =
∑
S ,T B(r | S , T ) B′(S , T ) = B(r|st) ×B′(st) ≈ 0.89. 6
To see how we obtained B′(st), see the footnote.7 As seen in above, the computation of B′(r) relies on B′(s) and
this is the reason why the value of B′(s) had to be established first. It shows that: a) probabilities associated with the
nodes are updated in a specific order, b) belief update is not always be a one-shot process but rather a sequence of
updates, and c) some nodes only have their probabilities updated after the execution of a particular action.
Expected Utility: We next calculate the expected utility (EU) obtained by executing the plan in the single action
case.
Definition 3.1 (Expected Utility of executing a plan). Given a belief state B, the expected utility of executing plan
P w.r.t goal a G = {l1, l2, . . . ln} is denoted as EUP(G ) and is defined as: EUP(G ) = U (G ) ×B′(G ), where B′
represents the updated belief state after executing P , i.e. the single action in the body. Note that EUP(G ) cannot be
greater than U (G ) as B′(G ) is at most 1.
Example 1(cont.): Let U (G ) = U ({r, s}) = 5. Then, EUP({s, r}) = U ({s, r}) × B′(s ∧ r) =
U ({s, r})∑P,Q,T B′(P,Q, r, s, T ) = U ({s, r}) B′(s | pq) B′(r|st) B′(t) B′(p) B′(q) = 4.45. 8
The expected utility is just under 90% of the maximum of 5 possible. Depending on the situation, this may or may
not be acceptable. In our example, making sure messages are delivered may be critical and 90% may not be good
enough. If this is so, the question then becomes whether the agent can do anything to increase the expected utility of
executing the plan. We address this next.
5 Observe from the CPT that B(s | P,Q)  0 iff P = p and Q = q. All other terms in the summation can be eliminated. So B′(s) =
B(s | p, q) B′(pq) = 1 ×B′(p) ×B′(q) [Independence Assumption] = 1 × 1 × 0.99 = 0.99
6 ∑
S ,T B(r | S , T ) B′(S , T ) =B(r|st) ×B′(st) =B(r|st) ×B′(st) = 1 × 0.89 ≈ 0.89
7 We know B′(st) = B′(PQRst). By conditional independence assumption, B′(PQRst) = B′(s | PQ)B′(R | st)B′(t)B′(P)B′(Q) =
B′(s | pq)B′(r | st)B′(t)B′(p)B′(q) = 1 × 1 × 0.9 × 1 × 0.99 ≈ 0.89.
8 From conditional independence assumptions, we get: EUP ({s, r}) = U ({s, r})
∑
P,Q,T B
′(s|PQ) B′(r|sT ) B′(T ) B′(P) B′(Q). As done in
the previous example, the only conditional probabilities that are non-zero due to the CPTs are when P = p, Q = q and T = t EUP ({s, r}) =
U ({s, r}) B′(s | pq) B′(r|st) B′(t) B′(p) B′(q) = 5 × 1 × 1 × 0.9 × 1 × 0.99 = 5 × 0.89 = 4.45
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Expected Utility with Perfect Information: Prior to sending the message to the client and assuming that the
status of mobile networks can be checked, the agent could: i) check that its mobile network is up and/or ii) check
that the customer’s network is up. We will call such actions information-seeking actions (ISA). These actions provide
the agent with perfect information so that after launching them, it is certain about the truth of the literals of interest.9
ISAs could be used for two primary purposes. First, confirming the context conditions and action preconditions where
absolutely certainty is required. Second, for increasing the expected utility of executing a plan. More formally,
Definition 3.2 (ISA). Given a belief state B and a set of literals V = {v1, . . . , vm}, an information-seeking action
isaV is an action such that if B′ represent the updated belief state after launching isaV , then for all vi ∈ V either
B′(vi) = 0 or B′(vi) = 1.
Before launching isaV , the agent is uncertain about truth of these literals in V , i.e. 0 < B(vi) < 1.10 The assumption
is that post-launch, the agent receives information that makes it certain about the truth of the literals in V , i.e. either
B′(vi) = 0 or B′(vi) = 1. ISAs do not come for free. Additional energy must be expended in order to use them which
can often be costly. We use kV to denote the cost of launching the action isaV . Are ISAs are worth being launched?
One way to answer this question is by computing the value of information gained by launching ISAs.
Definition 3.3 (EU with Perfect Information). Let an agent’s current belief state be B, let information-seeking action
isaV , where V = {v1, . . . , vm}, be launched and let B′ be the updated belief state after launching isaV . The expected
utility of executing plan P w.r.t goal a G with perfection information about the literals in V is denoted as EUP(G |
V ) and is defined as EUP(G | V ) = U (G ) ×B′(G ), where for each literal l: if l ∈ V or ¬l ∈ V , then B′(l) = 0 or
1, else B′(l) obtained using either Simple or Jeffrey condtionalization.
Note that there are m literals in V and for each one of them, the agent could either observe vi as being true or
false, i.e. B′(vi) = 0 or B′(vi) = 1. Thus, there are 2m potential expected utility functions that result from Def. 3.3
above. We will denote them as EU1(·), . . . , EU2m (·). They will be required for computing the value of information
that we take up shortly, but first let us look at an example of the expected utility of executing a plan after obtaining
perfect information about a set of literals. If V = {v1, v2}, when we write EUP(G | {v1, v2}), we mean the expected
utility after observing v1 and v2 as being true, i.e. probability of 1. Likewise, by EUP(G | {v1,¬v2}), we mean the
expected utility when observing v1 as being true and v2 as being false, i.e. probability of 1 and 0 respectively, and so on.
Example 1(cont.) Say prior to messaging the customer, the agent decides to launch an ISA, isa{t},
to verify the status of the customer’s network. Here V = {t}, therefore we can have two functions,
EU1 = EUP(G | {t}) and EU2 = EUP(G | {¬t}), one for possibly observing the network is up and one
for possibly observing it is down. Let us compute EU1(·) first. Observing t, the agent updates its belief
state so that B′(t) = 1. Belief updates of s and r are done as before, and we get B′(s) = B′(r) = 0.99.
Again, the only conditional probabilities that are non-zero due to the CPTs are when P = p, Q = q and
T = t. Therefore:
EUP({s, r} | {t}) = 4.95 11 and EUP({s, r} | {¬t}) = 0. 12
As we can see, for the agent to know with certainty that the rural network is up increases the expected utility of
executing the plan. If it is down, there is no utility obtained by executing the plan.
Value of Information: The expected utility values we just calculated are premised on the condition that an ISA to
confirm t’s value is actually launched. Since launching an ISA may be costly, we need to determine if it is worth our
while. We cannot be certain about the truth conditions of the literals we want to verify, thus in the defining the value
of information for an ISA every alternative must be considered.
9 While we do not consider it here, there may be ISAs that do not resolve the truth of a literal but merely increases/decreases an agent’s degree
of belief in a literal. See the discussion section.
10 An agent could be certain about the truth of the literals and still launch an isaV but it wouldn’t change its degree of belief in the literal.
11 EUP ({s, r} | {t}) = U ({s, r}) B′(s | pq) B′(r|st) B′(t) B′(p) B′(q) = 5 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 0.99 = 4.95
12 EUP ({s, r} | {¬t}) = U ({s, r})B′(s | pq)B′(r|s¬t)B′(¬t)B′(p)B′(q) = 5 × 1 × 0 × 1 × 1 × 0.99 = 0
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B(s) = 0 B(u) = 0
Figure 2. The Extended Bayesian Network for Ex. 2 showing only the new node U and it’s parent S with the beliefs prior to any actions being
executed.
Definition 3.4 (Value of Information VOI). Given a belief state B, goal G , plan P , isaV where V = {V1, . . . ,Vm},
the value of information w.r.t G , P and isaV is denoted as VOIG ,P,isaV or simply VOI when the context is clear, and
is defined as VOI = (
∑
B(V ) × EUP(G | V )) − EUP(G ) − kV
The intuition behind this definition is that each possible outcome of the literals in V are considered as the agent
cannot know what it will observe and the utility obtained by using that information is weighted by the prior belief in
the conjunction of the literals in V .
Example 1 (cont.): As in the previous example, let V = {t}. Also, let the cost kV = 0.1. Then
VOI = (
∑
B({t}) × EUP({r, s} | {t}) ) − EUP({r, s}) − 0.1. We know from the previous examples that
EUP({r, s}) = 4.45, EUP({s, r} | {t}) = 4.95 and EUP({s, r} | {¬t}) = 0. We also know B(t) = 0.9 and
B(¬t) = 0.1. We get, VOI = B(t) EUP({r, s} | {t})+B(¬t) EUP({r, s} | {¬t})− 4.45− 0.1 = −0.095. 13
So if the agent were to launch an ISA to detect the status of the rural network, there is negative information gain
or loss of information. This can be attributed to the cost of launching the ISA being too high. Observe that for the
information gain to be positive the cost must be less than 0.005.
Multiple Action Plans: We now consider plans with multiple actions in the body as shown below. Since sub-goals
can be decomposed into a sequence of actions, this case will also cover plans that have a mix of sub-goals and actions
in their body. G : C : a1, a2, . . . , an. Compared to the single action case, since there are multiple actions here, belief
updates must also occur after the execution of each action. Although the remaining analysis is the same as in the
single action case, for the sake of completeness, we extend the example we have been working with by including an
additional node in the Bayesian network to illustrate belief update and expected utility calculations in the multiple
actions case.
Table 2. Conditional probability table for Ex. 2
S B(u)
s 0.99
¬s 0
Example 2: Consider that after sending a SMS code to the customer, the agent must subsequently execute
an action save code that saves the code in a database so that it can be used to verify the code the customer
is expected to send. Let the variable U ranging over the literals u and ¬u stand for the belief that code is
saved and unsaved respectively. Let U’s parent node be S as shown in Fig. 2. The conditional probability
B(U | S ) in shown Table 2 which says even if the agent is certain the message has been sent, it believes
the code will only be saved in the database with a probability of 0.99.14 If the agent is certain that the
message has not been sent, then it will also know the code has not been saved.
The goal of the agent is as before to send a message and make sure the customer receives the message. Ad-
ditionally, the agent must now save the code in the database. For this example, the goal is G = {r, s, u} and
13 B(t) EUP ({r, s} | {t}) +B(¬t) EUP ({r, s} | {¬t}) − 4.45 − 0.1 = 0.9 × 4.95 + 0.1 × 0 − 4.55 = 4.455 − 4.55 = −0.095
14 This could be due to transient faults can be cause by electro-magnetic noise, power supply fluctuations, etc. that may affect the database.
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the plan is {r, s, u} : {〈q, 0.90〉} : send sms, save code. The new action save code has the following properties:
pre(save code) = {〈s, 1〉} and post(save code) = {u}.
Belief Update Multiple Actions: Recall that in the single acton case, belief update happened in stages. After
executing the send sms action, the belief in s was updated first, and then followed by r. In the multiple actions case,
we also have to contend with additional belief update stages that are introduced by other actions in the plan body.
As we show below, in our example the agent updates its beliefs first after executing send sms and then again after
executing save code. We will use B′,B′′,B′′′, . . . to denote the updated belief state due to a sequence of actions.
We often use B∗ to indicate the final belief state after executing all actions and completing all belief updates.
Example 2 (cont.): Let B’ be the agent’s updated belief state after executing send sms. The literals p, q, r,
s and t have the same probabilities in B’ as in Ex. 1. Recall that B′(s) = 0.99. Note that belief update of u
only happens if save code is executed, so B(u) = B′(u) = 0. Let B′′ = B∗ be the agent’s updated belief
state after executing save code. The probabilities of p, q, r, s and t remain unchanged in B′′. The only
thing left to calculate is B′′(u). This again is given by Jeffrey conditionalization as B′′(s) = 0.99. We get:
B′′(u) =
∑
S B(u | S ) B′′(S ) = 0.98 15
Let us compute the expected utility of the goal G = {r, s, u}. Let U (G) = 5. We get:
EUP({r, s, u}) = U ({r, s, u}) ×B∗(r, s, u) ≈ 4.41. 16
EU With Perfect Information: Let us calculate the expected utility with perfect information for this case.
Example 2 (cont): As done earlier, let isa{t} that verifies the status of the customer’s network be launched. Again,
there are two potential functions, EUP({r, s, u} | {t}) and EUP({r, s, u} | {¬t}). We get:
EUP({r, s, u} | {t}) = U ({r, s, u})
∑
P,Q B
∗(P,Q, r, s, t, u) = 4.90 17, and
EUP({r, s, u} | {¬t}) = U ({r, s, u})
∑
P,Q B
′(P,Q, r, s,¬t, u) = = 0 18
We can see from the examples above that much of the analysis in the multiple actions case is very similar to the single
action case. The only difference is that belief updates can be more complex because of multiple actions.
VOI - Multiple Actions: We now look at the VOI calculations in the multiple actions case.
Example 2 (cont.) : VOI calculations are also like in the single actions case. Let V = {t} and cost kV = 0.
We get:
VOI = (
∑
B({t}) × EUP({r, s, u} | {t})) − EUP({r, s, u}) − 0
We know from the previous examples that EUP({r, s, u}) = 4.41, EUP({r, s, u} | {t}) = 4.90 and
EUP({r, s, u} | {¬t}) = 0. We also know B(t) = 0.9 and B(¬t) = 0.1. Thus:
VOI = B(t) EUP({r, s, u} | {t}) +B(¬t) EUP({r, s, u} | {¬t}) − 4.41 − 0 = 0. 19
15 B′′(u) =
∑
S B(u | S ) B′′(S ) =B(u | s)B′′(s) +B(u | ¬s)B′′(¬s) = 0.99 × 0.99 + 0 × 0.01 = 0.98
16 EUP ({r, s, u}) = U ({r, s, u})×B∗(r, s, u) = 5×
∑
P,Q,T B
∗(P,Q, r, s, T, u) = 5×∑P,Q,T B∗(u | s) B∗(s | PQ) B∗(r | sT ) B∗(P) B∗(Q) B∗(T ) =
5 ×B∗(u | s) B∗(s | pq) B∗(r | st) B∗(p) B∗(q) B∗(t) = 5 × 0.99 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 0.99 × 0.9 ≈ 4.41
17 EUP ({r, s, u} | {t}) = U ({r, s, u})
∑
P,Q B
∗(P,Q, r, s, t, u) = 5 × B∗(u | s) B∗(s | PQ) B∗(r | st) B∗(P) B∗(Q) B∗(t) = 5 ×B∗(u | s) B∗(s |
pq) B∗(r | st) B∗(p) B∗(q) B∗(t) = 5 × 0.99 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 0.99 × 1 ≈ 4.90
18 EUP ({r, s, u} | {¬t}) = U ({r, s, u})
∑
P,Q B
′(P,Q, r, s,¬t, u) = = 5 × B′(u | s) B′(s | PQ) B′(r | s¬t) B′(P) B′(Q) B′(¬t) = 0.
19 VOI = B(t) EUP ({r, s, u} | {t}) +B(¬t) EUP ({r, s, u} | {¬t}) − 4.41 − 0 = 0.9 × 4.90 + 0.1 × 0 − 4.41 = 4.41 − 4.41 = 0
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In this case, there is no information gained by launching this ISA. Perhaps, the conditional probability (B(u | s)) is
already is quite high so that not much gain is seen even by launching an ISA.
4. Discussion
Information-Seeking Actions with Imperfect Information: The information-seeking actions that we considered
returned perfect information, i.e. the agent could know with certainty whether a literal is true or false. In reality, this
may not be possible with respect to all literals and information-seeking actions may instead increase, decrease or keep
the degree of belief in a literal unchanged. For instance, consider that an agent believes with 90% probability that
it is raining in a particular location; this belief could be premised on the weather forecast that it saw this morning
which said that there was a 90% chance of a shower. Now, later in the afternoon if it has a goal to achieve but one
that requires knowing the weather at the current moment at that location, the best it can do (assuming it has no one
to ask who lives there) is to look up the most recent forecast. The forecast could now say 95% chance of a shower
which means the agent doesn’t have perfect information but still increases its belief about rain. The expected utility
of its goals will however increase. Belief updates in such cases will have to rely on Jeffrey conditionalization which
we have already used in our example so this framework can handle such cases without major modifications.
Which Information-Seeking Action? As we have seen, there can be multiple ISAs that can be launched. Should
all possible ISAs be launched? This would certainly increase the expected utility of executing a plan but this may not
always be worthwhile. For instance, consider that there are two ISAs: isa1 and isa2 with costs k1 and k2 and with value
of information VOI1 and VOI2 respectively. If | k1 − k2 | is large but | VOI1 − VOI2 | is negligible, it will be better to
launch the ISA that incurs the lower cost. Of course, there may be other factors to consider too. If it is critical for the
expected utility of the plan to be as close as possible to the utility of the goal, then all ISAs should be launched.
BDI Plan Selection: In agent-programming languages like Jason [? ], if there are multiple applicable plans, a
applicable plan selection function can be used to select one plan. The default selection mechanism in Jason is to
choose the first plan that appears in the library. The framework that we proposed can be used to provide another plans
selection function for the applicable plans based on the value of information. If there are two plans P and P for
achieving goal G , a simple selection function could be one that chooses the plan that returns a higher VOI.
Belief Update: From the analysis of the motivating example, it can be seen that updating beliefs form the most
complex piece in our framework. This is not surprising as exact inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard and tech-
niques for approximate inference such as Monte Carlo sampling might be required [? ] . In our example, additionally,
we had to be careful about the order in which the nodes were updated after executing an action. Also, there were nodes
that are only affected when certain actions takes place. The Bayesian network in our example is simple enough that
we knew: i) the order in which the updates should happen and ii) which actions affect which nodes. One can easily
imagine a more complicated Bayesian network where knowing the two might not be as easy. Perhaps, these things
can be established in a systematic way and we hope to take this up as future work. Another interesting line of inquiry
is the connection between ISAs and the do calculus [? ]. The do(·) operator is an interventional action that sets the
value of a variable. One can see that it is analogous to ISAs which also sets the value of a variable although the means
by which it sets the value is not by direct intervention. This connection would be interesting to explore.
G2I and Enhancing Situational Understanding in the Tactical Environment: The high level objective for any
mission within a environment with competing agents is to preserve or enhance situation understanding and deliver
decision superiority to the agent of interest. SU is achieved by defining a set of mission goals, where information
requirements, as well as information sources, are derived to ensure each mission goal can be achieved. These goals
must be managed, usually through the situational understanding of not only the agent, but the tactical platform they are
utilising. Situational Understanding (SU) is defined as the ”product of applying analysis and judgment to the unit’s sit-
uation awareness to determine the relationships of the factors present and form logical conclusions concerning threats
to the force or mission accomplishment, opportunities for mission accomplishment, and gaps in information” [? ]. Of
note, the most accepted models of SU is the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act and Endsley’s Perception-Comprehension-
Projection model [? ]. The management of goals within the competitive environment is based on the current situation
being perceived. This is where agents will reason whether goals that were deemed achievable are now considered
unattainable, or just a lower priority. With the increase of objects being situated within the environment, tactical sit-
uations are becoming more complex for goal reasoning to be human centric. This view is supported by [? ], who
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believes that intelligent agents can assist in streamlining goal reasoning, due to their ability and flexibility to deliber-
ate quickly on an evolving situation. [? ] proposes the Tactical Battle Manager (TBM) that utilises a goal reasoning
agent as the central component of the system. [? ] TBM utilises belief update and belief revision based on the current
information presented to the goal reasoning agents. Furthermore, TBM relies on apriori set of actions. However, this
is where the similarities between [? ] and our proposed G2I end. [? ] states that in order to utilise their goal reasoning
agent within dynamic and unpredictable environments, some sort of scene- and situational- understanding component
needs to exist within TBM. Furthermore, TBM agents need to possess the ability to reason with mental models to
infer information related to the given situation, and exhibit an understanding of intent for both the human operator
and the object, as well as the information gathered within the environment . Finally, [? ] states that methods need to
be developed to proceed with goals deemed to be unachievable in its current form.
The G2I can assist tactical platforms in assessing whether an operator is diverging from a mission goal, since the
information being generated by the user, as well as the information gathered and processed from the tactical environ-
ment can determine if an operators belief set is causing goal refinement. The nexus between goals and information
can assist in the introduction of situation-aware systems at the tactical edge. [? ] agrees, however the G2I will ensure
that the tracking of semantic and affective information through computational analysis is far more bounded, timely
and adaptive.
5. Conclusion
The connection between between an agent’s goal and the information requirements for achieving that goal has
received little attention in the literature. This paper shows that the executability condition of plans and actions that
help achieve the goal is one way to establish such a connection and that the standard BDI framework may be extended
by including probabilistic beliefs, goals and actions, which allows us to compute the expected utility of goals. We also
introduce the notion of information-seeking actions that can help meet these information requirement and show how
they may be exploited by the agent to increase the expected utility of its goals. Finally, we discuss how this work may
be further extended specifically with regards to its role in enhancing situational understanding.
